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INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, after decades of litigation, the major tobacco 
companies1 negotiated a settlement reimbursing the Medicare 
expenses that forty-six states incurred to treat citizens suffering from 
the adverse effects of smoking.2  This settlement, as well as its 
preceding litigation, introduced a new method through which 
unpopular industries could be persuaded, if not forced, to change 
their business practices as well as garner impressive fees for attorneys.  
Robert Reich, former Secretary of Labor under President Clinton, 
best termed this new era of attacking unpopular industries as 
“regulation through litigation.”3  That is, the plaintiffs’ bar, perhaps 
 
 ∗ J.D. 2004, Seton Hall University Law School; B.A. 2000, Saint Joseph’s 
University. 
 1 Hereinafter referred to as “Big Tobacco,” a common phrase for the major 
tobacco companies.  These include American Brands, Inc.; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation; Batus, Inc.; Philip Morris 
Companies, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Company, Inc.; Loews Corporation; United 
States Tobacco Company; and Liggett Group, Inc.  See infra Part I. 
 2 See A New Tobacco Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998, § 4, at 2 (stating that 46 states 
settled with tobacco companies for $206 billion).  For purposes of this Comment, 
adverse effects include lung cancer, throat cancer, mouth cancer, emphysema, and 
heart disease.  Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota reached their own 
respective settlements.  W. Kip Viscusi, Tobacco: Regulations and Taxation Through 
Litigation, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 46 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).  The 
tobacco industry settled with Mississippi for $3.5 billion, Texas for $15.3 billion, 
Florida for $11.3 billion, and Minnesota for $6.6 billion.  Id.  For complete details of 
each state settlement, see http://www.stic. neu.edu (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). 
 3 Robert Reich, Regulation is Out, Litigation is In, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1999, at 
15A.  W. Kip Viscusi questions this approach.  See Viscusi, supra note 2, at 23.  In his 
view, taxation, rather than litigation, would bring about a more appropriate and 
efficient reform.  See id. at 30.  The difficulty, however, is that such a tax would be 
regressive and may reduce demand.  Id.  Under Viscusi’s economic analysis of 
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motivated by the profitability of settlement, targets industries such as 
asbestos manufacturers,4 Big Tobacco,5 HMOs,6 lead paint 
manufacturers,7 and gun manufacturers8 through litigation to 
compensate consumers and end harmful business practices and 
production.  Because of the massive amount of attorney’s fees 
available in these lawsuits, plaintiffs’ attorneys have become the new 
“watch dogs” for the American consumer.9  Fast food companies10 are 
the latest targets of plaintiffs’ attorneys who hope to change the 
industry’s practices of food preparation, marketing, and packaging of 
products.  In addition, they also may hope to garner impressive fees 
that will equip them with the necessary resources to wage war against 
other industries. 
On July 23, 2002, Caesar Barber11 filed a class action suit against 
the nation’s major fast food companies, McDonald’s Corporation, 
Burger King Corporation, KFC Corporation, and Wendy’s 
International Corporation, alleging their foods were responsible for 
 
tobacco regulation, such a reduction in demand would be counterproductive.  Id. 
 4 See, e.g., Amechem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 5 See infra Part I. 
 6 See, e.g., In re Managed Care Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
 7 See, e.g., Brenner v. Am. Cyanimid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1999). 
 8 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 9 Joseph Nocera, First, Who’s Running This Country, Anyway?  We, the Lawyers, 
FORTUNE, Nov. 8, 1999, at 38-39.  Not only have lawyers attacked the fast food 
industry, the film industry is launching its own attack.  Morgan Spurlock produced, 
directed, and starred in a documentary about the effects of eating fast food.  SUPER 
SIZE ME (Morgan Spurlock and The Con 2004).  In the film, Spurlock eats exclusively 
at McDonald’s for one month and documents the health effects he suffered.  See 
http://www.supersizeme.com/ home.aspx?page=aboutmovie (last visited Mar. 5, 
2004). 
 10 For purposes of this Comment, “fast food companies” include the McDonald’s 
Corporation, Burger King Corporation, KFC Corporation, d/b/a Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, and Wendy’s International Corporation.  These are the parties named in 
the pending class action lawsuit filed in the Bronx, NY.  For a complete copy of the 
Barber’s complaint [hereinafter Barber Compl.], see 
http://banzhaf.net/docs/nyccomp.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004). 
 11 Mr. Barber is a resident of the Bronx in his late fifties suffering from various 
health conditions he claims resulted from his steady diet of foods marketed by the 
fast food industry.  See supra note 10.  He claims he did not realize that fast food 
products were unhealthy.  Barber Compl. at ¶ 41.  Recent contacts with attorney 
Samuel Hirsch revealed that he ceased pursuing the Barber class action, awaiting a 
ruling on a class action he filed against the fast food giants on behalf of obese 
children.  E-mail from Samuel Hirsch, Managing Partner, Samuel Hirsch and 
Associates, to John Zefutie, J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University Law School (Jan. 
16, 2003, 13:29 EST) (on file with author).  That subsequent action was dismissed.  
See Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., No. CIV 02-7821, 2003 WL 22052778 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
3, 2003) [hereinafter Pelman II].  Nonetheless, his complaint serves as a model for 
the type of claims plaintiffs’ attorneys will bring against fast food companies both 
now and in the future.  See supra note 10. 
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his related health problems.12  This suit was one of two class actions 
filed in New York against these companies; the other class action was 
dismissed in January of 2003. 13  In Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.,14 a class 
of obese teenagers brought suit against these same defendants 
alleging, inter alia, that defendants’ failure to warn consumers of its 
food content contributed to their obesity and subsequent health 
problems.15  Although the court held that the facts alleged in the 
complaint did not adequately specify a cause of action,16 the court 
granted plaintiff’s motion to amend.17  The district court reasoned, 
“one necessary element of any potentially viable claim must be that 
McDonalds’ products involve a danger that is not within the common 
knowledge of consumers”; an element the original complaint failed 
to specify. 18 
Mr. Barber suffers from a variety of health problems including 
high blood pressure and heart disease, which obesity may cause.19  
Relying on a recent study released by the United States Surgeon 
General, Mr. Barber alleged the fast food industry’s business practices 
contribute to the increasing overweight/obesity epidemic in the 
United States.20He claimed he was not aware that fast food products 
were unhealthy,21 and alleged negligent food preparation, failure to 
warn of the adverse health effects22 of eating fast food, failure to post 
 
 12 Barber Compl., supra note 10, at ¶ 1. 
 13 See Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
[hereinafter Pelman I].  On January 22, 2003, Federal District Judge Robert Sweet for 
the District of New York dismissed the class action filed on behalf of all obese 
children.  Id.  He did not, however, dismiss the case as frivolous.  Id.  Rather, the 
judge stated that the arguments plaintiffs allege would be more compelling if they 
were explored in greater depth.  Id. at 543.  He allowed plaintiffs thirty days to 
amend their complaint to establish that the dangers of fast food were not commonly 
known, thus giving rise to a duty to warn on the part of McDonald’s.  Id. (citing 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962)).  Shortly after, on February 19, 2003, plaintiffs 
filed an amended complaint.  Pelman  II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *1; see also infra Part 
II E.  The court, after analyzing plaintiffs’ allegations under the New York Consumer 
Fraud Statute, granted McDonald’s Corporation’s motion to dismiss. Pelman II, 2003 
WL 22052778, at *15 (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349, 350 (Consol. 1999)). 
 14 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 15 See id. 
 16 Id. at 543. 
 17 Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (requiring that “leave [to amend] shall be 
freely given when justice so requires”). 
 18 Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 518. 
 19 Barber Compl., supra note 10, at 17 (citing U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERV.  THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE 
OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY (2001)). 
 20 Id. ¶ 3. 
 21 Barber Compl., supra note 10, at ¶ 41. 
 22 Adverse health effects in the fast food context include coronary heart disease, 
  
1386 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:1383 
nutritional facts, and violation of New York’s Consumer Protection 
Act.23The complaint further contended that the defendant fast food 
companies were responsible for his medical problems, as well as his 
ignorance that fast food is an unhealthy product.24 
Legal and media commentators alike analogize this suit to Big 
Tobacco litigation and state attorney general settlement.25  It is 
evident that this suit was inspired, in part, by the success of the Big 
Tobacco litigation and settlement, but the question still remains: Will 
the litigation tactics used in suits against Big Tobacco serve as an 
instructive model for fast food litigation?  This Comment explores 
that question and proposes that while there are some similarities 
between fast food and Big Tobacco claims, essential elements that 
brought Big Tobacco to the negotiating table are missing. 
Part I outlines the development of the Big Tobacco litigation, as 
well as the nation-wide settlement between Big Tobacco and states’ 
attorneys general.  Part II discusses the fast food industry and how its 
practices could potentially give rise to a cause of action within the tort 
litigation context.  It also summarizes the current “obesity epidemic” 
and how the fast food industry may or may not have contributed to 
that epidemic.  Part III offers suggestions as to how those bringing 
actions against the fast food industry can learn from the Big Tobacco 
settlement. 
Fast food litigation is looking to compensate individuals for 
alleged unfair practices by the fast food industry.  Plaintiffs, however, 
face formidable obstacles.26  First, plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking to 
attack the fast food industry on the bases of negligence or failure to 
warn will have difficulty in establishing causation.  Second, neither 
 
type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure, gallbladder disease, and elevated cholesterol 
levels.  See id. at ¶ 3; see also Aviva Must et al., The Disease Burden Associated With 
Overweight and Obesity, 282 JAMA 1523 (1999). 
 23 Barber Compl., supra note 10, ¶ 35-56. 
 24 Id. ¶ 1. 
 25 See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, The “Big Fat” Class Action Lawsuit Against Fast Food 
Companies: Is It More Than Just A Stunt?, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/ 
200220814.html. (2002) (on file with author); see also Cindi Ross, Warning: Super-Size 
Fries Make You Fat, Suing Over It Makes You A Jerk, THE STATE, Aug. 13, 2002. 
 26 In fact, the United States House of Representatives just recently passed the 
“Cheeseburger Bill,” a law barring lawsuits brought against fast food companies.  Liza 
Porteus & Brian Wilson, House Passes ‘Cheeseburger Bill’ (Mar. 10, 2004), at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,113836,00.html.  The bill is officially entitled 
the “Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act.”  Id.  The law prohibits 
actions by consumers who eat great quantities of fast food.  Id.  The bill does not, 
however, prohibit suits rooted in theories of mislabeling or tainting food products.  
Id.  For a complete copy of the proposed bill, see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c108:2:./temp/ ~c108ZmMMWv:: (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). 
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the scientific community, nor plaintiffs’ attorneys, have offered 
conclusive evidence that fast food is addictive, that the industry 
manipulated any supposed addictive qualities, that the industry knew 
of the food’s addictive qualities, and that the industry subsequently 
misled consumers regarding that fact.  If such evidence existed, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys would have a considerable advantage.  Absent 
fraud, however, their task is quite difficult.  Third, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
do not, as of yet, have the assistance of states’ attorneys general. 
PART I—LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT: A DISCUSSION OF 
THE BIG TOBACCO LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY GENERAL 
SETTLEMENT 
A. The First and Second Waves 
Scholars categorize the Big Tobacco litigation into three waves.27  
The “First Wave” occurred between the years of 1954 and 1973.28  
During this period, plaintiffs’ attorneys brought suit under theories 
of negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, and deceit.29  
The litigation in this era followed the lung cancer scare in the early 
1950s when scientists first released laboratory research linking 
smoking to cancer in mice.30  The problem facing attorneys, however, 
was causation.  During the First Wave, technology was obsolete, and, 
thus, plaintiffs could not establish any correlation between smoking 
and cancer in humans.31  The tobacco companies adopted and clung 
to the “constitutional hypothesis” offered by biologist Clarence Cook 
Little.32  Little argued that many factors contributed to cancer, and no 
one cause, especially smoking, could bear the blame.33  Specifically, 
he argued that a damaged or defective gene was the most likely cause 
of cancer.34 
 
 27 See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 88 STAN. L. 
REV. 853 (1992); Peter Pringle, The Chronicles of Tobacco: An Account of the Forces that 
Brought the Tobacco Industry to the Negotiating Table, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 387 
(1999); Bryce A. Jensen, From Tobacco to Healthcare and Beyond—A Critique of Lawsuits 
Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1334 (2001). 
 28 Pringle, supra note 27, at 389. 
 29 Graham E. Kelder & Richard A. Daynar, The Role of Litigation in the Effective 
Control of the Sales and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 71 (1997). 
 30 Pringle, supra note 27, at 389. 
 31 Id. 
 32 PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED, BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE  114 (1998). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id.; see also STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 350 (1996).  Sir 
Ronald Fisher developed the constitutional hypothesis.  Id.  He argued as well that 
certain people were pre-disposed to developing lung cancer.  Id. 
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Courts were forced to dismiss most, if not all, of the claims filed 
in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s because of lack of scientific evidence.35  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys were able to overcome this hurdle in the “Second 
Wave” of tobacco litigation.36  Between 1983 and 1992, smokers were 
able to establish a causal link between smoking and lung cancer.37  In 
addition, plaintiffs’ attorneys were offering new theories of liability 
such as strict liability, “overpromotion,” and breach of express 
warranty.38  Big Tobacco, however, was able to ward off attacks by 
embracing an assumption of risk defense.39  According to the tobacco 
industry, plaintiffs knew of the dangers of smoking when they 
consumed cigarettes because they had been adequately warned, 
pursuant to statutory mandate.40  In 1965, Congress passed the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,41 which specified in 
great detail the appropriate phrasing of warnings,42 requirements for 
outdoor billboards,43 and appropriate size fonts of each warning.44  
 
 35 See, e.g., Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969); Hudson v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970); Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963); Scott v. Hernon, 278 N.E.2d 259 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1971); see also Pringle, see supra note 27, at 389. 
 36 Pringle, see supra note 27, at 389. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Marc Z. Edell, Cigarette Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 90, 93-96 
(1986). 
 39 See, e.g., Pennington v. Visitron Corp., 876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that a wife of a cigarette smoker was not entitled to recover under a failure to warn 
theory absent a causal connection); Gilboy v. Am. Tobacco Co., 572 So. 2d 289 (La. 
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs could not recover for illness allegedly caused 
by cigarettes due to widespread knowledge of the detrimental effects of smoking); 
Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 418 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1988) (holding that the risk of 
developing cancer fell within the risk assumed by a smoker); Dewey v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 542 A.2d 919 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (holding, 
inter alia, that plaintiff’s claim for failure to warn was preempted by the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act); see also Pringle, supra note 27, at 389; 
Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 508 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. 
1998) (stating the elements of assumption of risk: “(1) the plaintiff must have 
knowledge of the facts constituting a dangerous condition; (2) the plaintiff must 
know the condition is dangerous; (3) the plaintiff must appreciate the nature and 
extent of the danger; and (4) the plaintiff must voluntarily expose himself to the 
danger. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 40 See PRINGLE, supra note 32, at 114. 
 41 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000). 
 42 § 1333(a)(1).  This section provides for four different warnings.  Id.  These 
warnings are preceded by the phrase, “Surgeon General’s Warning.”  Id.  The 
warnings prescribed are as follows: “Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, 
Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy; Quitting Smoking Now Greatly 
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health; Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in 
Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight; Cigarette Smoke Contains 
Carbon Monoxide.”  Id. 
 43 § 1333(a)(3).  This section provides that similar warnings described in supra 
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Armed with the statute, Big Tobacco repeatedly won cases asserting 
that the smoker knew that the habit was dangerous and voluntarily 
chose to smoke knowing the risks.45 
B. Class Action Certification and de-Certification: Barnes, Castano, 
and the “Sons of Castano” 
Since lawsuits in the “Second Wave” failed to bring about any 
significant change in the manufacturing, marketing, and sale of 
cigarettes, plaintiffs’ attorneys made use of the class action in an 
attempt to shift the jury’s focus from the guilty plaintiff to a 
commonality of harm imposed by Big Tobacco’s products – namely 
cigarettes.46  The first of these cases was Castano v. American Tobacco 
Co.47 Plaintiffs brought their class action in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.48  The class included “all 
nicotine dependent persons in the United States, its territories and 
possessions and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico who have 
purchased and smoked cigarettes manufactured by the tobacco 
companies,”49 which included approximately 40 million claimants.50 
In Castano, the district court found that the requirements of 
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were satisfied.51  
 
note 42 apply to outdoor billboards.  Id. 
 44 Section 1333(b)(1) reads: 
The phrase ‘Surgeon General’s Warning’ shall appear in capital letters 
and the size of all other letters in the label shall be the same as the size 
of such letters as of October 12, 1984.  All the letters in the label shall 
appear in conspicuous and legible type in the contrast by typography, 
layout, or color with all other printed material on the package. 
Id. 
 45 See Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963); Ross v. 
Philip Morris & Co., Ltd., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Dewey v. R. J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990); see also Pringle, supra note 27, at 392. 
 46 Richard L. Antogini, New U.S. Tort Litigation: To Go Warily Where No One Has 
Gone Before: Courts Now Are Being Used by Plaintiff’s Counsel to Change Industry-Wide 
Practices, To Enforce Self-Regulation and to Extract Large Punitive Damages Awards, 67 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 454, 459 (2000). 
 47 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev’d, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 48 Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 544. 
 49 Id. at 549. 
 50 Id. at 550; see also Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 
51 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 333 (2001).  Rabin also argues that this certification fit nicely 
with the plaintiffs’ claim that tobacco executives engaged in a pattern of conduct that 
concealed nicotine’s addictive quality.  Id. 
 51 Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 550-51; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (stating in relevant 
part that one can sue on behalf of others if: the class is so numerous making joinder of 
all of the members impracticable, there are common questions of law or fact to the 
class, the claims and/or defenses of the class representative are typical of those of the 
entire class, and “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect” the class’ 
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Though the court denied plaintiff’s motion for class certification 
based on Rule 23(b)(2),52 it granted certification based on Rule 
23(b)(3),53 finding that common issues of law and fact predominated 
the class.  The district court held that the various state consumer 
protection statutes did not differ significantly as to preclude class 
certification.54 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit overturned the district court’s 
holding.55  It held that the lower court erred in two ways in granting 
class certification.56  First, the district court did not consider variations 
in state consumer protection laws that could affect the predominance 
requirement.57  Second, the lower court’s “predominance inquiry did 
not include consideration of how a trial on the merits would be 
conducted.”58  Furthermore, the court of appeals held that class 
certification would have placed an undue burden on the tobacco 
companies because certification would lead to a flood of 
“unmeritorious claims.”59 
In Barnes v. American Tobacco Co.,60 the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals overturned another class action on similar grounds.  The 
court found that “addiction, causation, the defenses of comparative 
and contributory negligence, the need for medical monitoring and 
the statute of limitations present too many individual issues to permit 
certification.”61  The court placed particular emphasis on the issue of 
addiction.62  It reasoned that addiction was the main component of 
causation in these sorts of class actions: “[a]ddiction remains an 
 
interest) (emphasis added). 
 52 Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 551-52; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (allowing a 
certification for a class that requests only equitable relief).  The plaintiffs in Castano, 
however, requested legal relief as well.  Id. 
 53 Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 554-56; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (stating in 
relevant part that the court should grant class certification if it finds “that the 
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”). 
 54 Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 554. 
 55 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 56 Id. at 740. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 746 (citing In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165 (2d 
Cir. 1987)).  The court reasoned: “In the context of mass tort class actions, 
certification dramatically affects the stakes for defendants.  Class certification 
magnifies and strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims.”  Id. 
 60 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 61 Id. at 143. 
 62 Id. at 144. 
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essential part of plaintiff’s claim.  In order to prevail on their medical 
monitoring claim—under any of their three theories of liability 
(negligence, strict products liability and intentional exposure to a 
hazardous substance)—plaintiffs must demonstrate defendants caused 
their exposure to tobacco.”63 
Barnes is indicative of how courts struck down class actions filed 
in federal court.  It was the Castano decision, however, that caused the 
plaintiffs’ bar to refocus their efforts in state court.64  Its strategy was 
to flood local state courts with class actions wherein the class 
members were state residents who were suffering from the adverse 
effects of smoking.65  Massachusetts Congressman Martin Meehan 
termed these cases as the “sons of Castano.”66  Since many of these 
claims are in the midst of litigation or have been dismissed, it is 
difficult to assess whether this was an effective strategy. 
One case, however, suggested that this was a sound plan of 
attack.  In Engle v. R.J. Reynolds,67 a Florida superior court judge 
granted class certification.68  After the court affirmed certification, the 
jury found that Big Tobacco engaged in deceptive conduct, that a 
causal relation existed between smoking and the diseases the class 
suffered, and that punitive damages were appropriate.69  The jury 
then awarded $12.7 million in compensatory damages and $144.8 
billion in punitive damages.70  The Florida Appellate Court, however, 
overturned this award in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle.71 
In Liggett, the court held, first, that the smokers’ claims were too 
“uniquely individualized” to satisfy the predominance and superiority 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Pringle, supra note 27, at 395. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Anthony Flint, Court Derails Class-Action Tobacco Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, May 24, 
1996 at 1.  See, e.g., State v. Am. Tobacco Co., 772 So. 2d 417 (Ala. 2000); Daniels v. 
Philip Morris Co., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Connecticut v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., No. X02 CV 960148414S, 1998 WL 800274 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 
1998); People v. Philip Morris, Inc., 759 N.E.2d 906 (Ill. 2001); State ex rel. Miller v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1998); Scott v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
725 So. 2d 10 (La. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 96122017, 
CL211487, 1997 WL 540913 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 21, 1997); Massachusetts v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., No. 957378J, 1998 WL 1181992 (Mass. Super. Mar. 20, 1998); Ren 
v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-004035-CZ, 2002 WL 1839983 (Mich. Cir. Ct. June 11, 
2002); Walls v. Am. Tobacco Co., 11 P.3d 626 (Okla. 2000). 
 67 2000 WL 33534572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2000), rev’d, Liggett Group, Inc. 
v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 68 Engle, 2000 WL 3353472, at *31. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
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requirements the Florida class action rule requires.72  Second, the 
court took issue with the lower court’s award of class-wide punitive 
damages before making any finding as to liability of or among the 
defendants.73  Such an approach, the court reasoned, violated Florida 
law in that there was no method of determining whether there was a 
rational relationship between the liability imposed and the punitive 
damages awarded.74  Also, the punitive damages award was so 
excessive that it violated both federal and state law and would 
bankrupt the defendants.75  Finally, the court held that the attorney 
general’s settlement with Big Tobacco barred any claims brought by 
these plaintiffs.76 
The failure of Castano and the general ineffectiveness of the 
“sons of Castano” compelled plaintiffs’ attorneys and other anti-
smoking interest groups to develop a new strategy to regulate tobacco 
through the courtroom—thus, the “Third Wave.” 
C. The Third Wave—Attorneys General Join the Fray 
The “Third Wave” ushered in a new theory of recovery.  In a new 
tactic, state attorneys general brought suit on behalf of the states to 
recover Medicare costs incurred to treat individuals suffering from 
tobacco-related illnesses.77  Michael Moore, Attorney General for 
Mississippi, was the creator of this strategy.78  The idea was to treat Big 
Tobacco like any other enterprise that hurts consumers through its 
 
 72 Id. at 444 (citing FL. CT. C.P.R. 1.220).  According to the court, allowing 
certification of a class with significant individual issues would be unjust and 
unmanageable.  Id. at 445.  Furthermore, the court required “each claimant . . . to 
prove that his or her illness not only was caused by the smoking, but was also 
proximately caused by defendants’ alleged misconduct.”  Id. at 446. 
 73 Id. at 450.  This “cart before the horse” award of punitive damages violated 
well-established Florida law, which requires that the defendant “be found liable 
before any punishment is imposed.”  Id. at 451 (citing Ault v. Lohr, 598 So. 2d 454, 
457 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring)). 
 74 Liggett, 853 So. 2d at 451 (citations omitted).  “Without this prior assessment it 
is impossible to determine whether punitive damages bear a ‘reasonable’ 
relationship to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff . . . .”  Id. 
 75 Id. at 456 (citing Arab Termite & Pest Control of Florida, Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 
So. 2d 1039, 1043 (Fla. 1982); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 
532 U.S. 424 (2001)). 
 76 Liggett, 853 So. 2d at 467.  The court stated that “Florida settled and released its 
claims in 1997, by entering into the Florida Settlement Agreement . . . which 
resolved with finality all of Florida’s claims, ‘including those for punitive damages.’”  
Id. at 467-68; see also supra note 2. 
 77 See cases cited infra note 83. 
 78 See Henry Weinstein, Tobacco Industry Target of Taxpayer Suits Smoking: Litigants 
in 2 Massive Cases Want Federal Government Reimbursed for Health Care Costs, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 17, 1997, at D3. 
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products.79  In essence, the attorneys general attacked Big Tobacco as 
if they were companies who used asbestos or dumped toxic waste, 
forcing them to clean up the mess.80  This proved advantageous for 
two reasons.  First, Big Tobacco was no longer an insurmountable 
defendant when faced with the resources of the state.81  Second, the 
states were viewed as innocent third parties; thus, Big Tobacco could 
not effectively use the assumption of risk defense.82  The attorneys 
general of Minnesota, Florida, and West Virginia soon followed 
Mississippi’s lead and filed suit in their respective state courts.83 
One important component of the “Third Wave” was that the suit 
was not a section 402A84 products liability claim.85  The parties 
involved were the state and the tobacco manufacturers, rather than 
the consumers and tobacco manufacturers.86  Another crucial factor 
of the Third Wave is that attorneys general hired plaintiffs’ attorneys 
to bring suits on behalf of the states. 87  As such, the plaintiffs’ bar 
began to pool their resources and coordinate their efforts.  Scholars 
argue that the combination of state-forged Medicare recovery actions 
and the centralization of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ resources shifted the 
 
 79 PRINGLE, supra note 32, at  7. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Howard M. Erichson, The End of the Defendant Advantage in the Tobacco Litigation, 
26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 132 (2001). 
 82 Id.; see also supra note 39. 
 83 See Florida v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. CIV-95-1446 (Fla. 15th Jud. Cir. 1995); Am. 
Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Group Health Plan, 
Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., et al., 621 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 2001); State v. Philip Morris 
Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996); Ludke v. Philip Morris Co., Inc., No. MC 00-
1954, 2001 WL 1673791 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 21, 2001); McGraw v. Am. Tobacco 
Co., No. 94-C-1707, 1995 WL 569618 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 6, 1995); see also PRINGLE, 
supra note 32, at 7 (1998); Viscusi, supra note 2, at 42. 
 84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).  Section 402A provides in 
pertinent part: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or 
consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business 
of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the 
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which 
it is sold. 
(2) The rule of subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has 
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 
Id. 
 85 Panel Discussion, The Tobacco Industry Settlement: Practical Implications and the 
Future of Tort Law, 67 MISS. L.J. 847, 870 (1998). 
 86 Id. at  870. 
 87 Erichson, supra note 81, at 130. 
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balance of power from Big Tobacco, and its seemingly unlimited 
resources, to plaintiffs—both states and smokers.88 
Two other important factors in the Third Wave were issues of 
causation.  First, the courts recognized the link between smoking and 
risks to one’s health in the 1990s.  Specifically, attorneys in the Third 
Wave relied heavily on the 1962 Surgeon General’s Report that 
smoking was indeed related to lung cancer in both men and 
women.89  This report, however, failed to establish a causal link 
between smoking and chronic bronchitis/emphysema.90  Second, 
economic effects of smoking began to make themselves apparent in 
the Third Wave.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys, on behalf of the state, 
emphasized that smoking cost the nation approximately $100 billion 
dollars per year—$50 billion in doctors fees, drugs, hospital bills, etc., 
and $50 billion in lost working hours and income taxes.91  The Third 
Wave proved to be the key to regulating Big Tobacco and its 
practices.  The intervention of state attorneys general and the 
assistance of the plaintiffs’ bar led to discovery of key documents and 
inside information integral to Big Tobacco’s defeat. 
D. Fraud and Settlement 
Generally, the attorneys general in the Third Wave hoped to use 
the courtroom as a forum to expose the tobacco industry’s business 
practices and the detrimental effects of smoking.  In other words, 
though people chose to smoke, they did not know of the harmful 
effects of cigarettes or the addictive quality of nicotine.92  The 
existence of fraud93 on the part of Big Tobacco, however, was the key 
factor in the settlement between tobacco companies and the forty-six 
states.94  Attorneys general and the plaintiffs’ bar were able to 
 
 88 Id. at 131. 
 89 PRINGLE, supra note 32, at 135-36 (citing the 1962 Surgeon General’s Report).  
The report states in relevant part: “Cigarette smoking is causally related to lung 
cancer in men; the magnitude and effect of cigarette smoking far outweighs all other 
factors.  The data for women, though less extensive, points in the same direction.”  
Id. 
 90 Id. at 135-36 (citing the 1962 Surgeon General’s Report). 
 91 See David Greising & Linda Himelstein, Does Tobacco Pay Its Way?, BUS. WK., 
Feb. 19, 1996. 
 92 Panel Discussion, supra note 85, at 870. 
 93 See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (stating elements of common 
law fraud: “(1) a false statement concerning a material fact; (2) the representor’s 
knowledge that the representation is false; (3) an intention that the representation 
induce another to rely on it; and (4) consequent injury by the party acting in 
reliance on the representation”). 
 94 Mississippi, Minnesota, Florida, and West Virginia were not part of the 
settlement since they filed and settled separate actions on behalf of the citizens in 
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establish fraud through two principal actions of Big Tobacco – 
namely whistle-blowers and attorney-client privilege.95 
Whistle-blowers are a relatively new phenomenon in mass tort 
litigation.96  They have proved especially useful in litigation targeting 
an unpopular industry.  In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, whistle-
blowers were instrumental in cases involving chemical dumping, 
asbestos diseases, and unsafe drugs.97  Like the “muckrakers” of the 
industrial revolution, whistle-blowers were often labeled as “left wing 
trouble-makers.”98  Merrell Williams was the first of such whistle-
blowers in the tobacco litigation.99  He served as a paralegal for the 
law firm representing Brown and Williamson.100  During his time 
there, he had photocopied hundreds, if not thousands, of documents 
showing that Brown and Williamson knew of the addictive qualities of 
tobacco.101  Williams’ activity proved to be problematic for Big 
Tobacco for two reasons. 
First, because attorneys general could now prove nicotine was 
addictive, their allegations of fraud became stronger.102  Furthermore, 
seven tobacco CEOs testified before a congressional committee 
formed to investigate the detrimental health effects of smoking, 
claiming they did not believe nicotine was addictive.103  Their 
testimony made Big Tobacco’s position even less credible.  Second, 
because the documents demonstrated nicotine’s addictiveness, Big 
Tobacco could no longer assert that smokers voluntarily “chose” to 
smoke.104 
Furthermore, Williams provided attorneys general and the 
plaintiffs’ bar with documentation showing that attorneys took part in 
many of Big Tobacco’s cover-ups.105  With each document Williams 
provided, the charge of fraud resounded with even more resonance.  
 
their respective states.  See supra note 2. 
 95 PRINGLE, supra note 32, at 57. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 60. 
 101 CARRICK MOLLENKAPM ET AL., THE PEOPLE V. BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES 
TOOK ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS 38 (1998).  Williams also provided memoranda 
requesting scientific documents be filtered through Brown and Williamson’s 
attorneys so as to give them appearance of being prepared in anticipation of 
litigation.  Id. at 132. 
 102 PRINGLE, supra note 32, at 60. 
 103 Id. at 78-81. 
 104 Id. at 68. 
 105 Id. 
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Big Tobacco’s lawyers had set up a secret fund “enabling them to 
sponsor, and monitor, tobacco research that would be especially 
useful in defending liability suits.  They also suggested ways that 
scientific reports could be censored to remove facts embarrassing to 
the industry.”106  Attorneys for Big Tobacco also took the time to label 
“sensitive research documents” as privileged or work product in an 
attempt to shield them from public release.107 
Jeffrey Wigand was another key whistle-blower.108  Known as the 
ultimate insider, Wigand, head of Research and Development for 
Brown and Williamson, breached his confidentiality agreement with 
the company and disclosed that Big Tobacco was aware of the 
addictive quality of nicotine.109  Because the company was aware of its 
product’s effect on smokers, they manipulated nicotine levels to keep 
their “customers” coming back.110  In other words, Brown and 
Williamson, as well as the other Big Tobacco giants, knew of the 
health risks of smoking and took affirmative steps to keep smokers 
hooked.111  Wigand demonstrated that: 
[a] large number of chemicals end up in cigarette tobacco 
besides the ones that come naturally in the tobacco plant.  They 
include not only the residue of pesticides and insecticides, but 
also compounds added as flavorings in the factory.  Still more are 
produced by the burning of tobacco.112 
The final whistle-blower was Bennett LeBow, a Big Tobacco 
CEO.113  As part of a settlement with the attorneys general and the 
plaintiffs’ bar, LeBow, CEO of the Liggett Group, admitted that he 
knew nicotine was addictive and that the other companies also knew 
as much.114  LeBow was the first CEO to admit that he and Big 
Tobacco knew nicotine was addictive and caused cancer.115  This 
effectively brought an end to Big Tobacco’s defense that it was not 
aware of nicotine’s addictive quality.  LeBow was willing to negotiate a 
 
 106 Id. at 60. 
 107 Id. at 154; see also supra note 101. 
 108 PRINGLE, supra note 32, at 178.  Touchstone Pictures presented a feature film 
about Jeffrey Wigand and the CBS 60 Minutes presentation of the information he 
had about Brown and Williamson’s fraud.  See THE INSIDER (Touchstone Pictures 
1998). 
 109 PRINGLE, see supra note 32, at 179. 
 110 See id. at 182. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 181. 
 113 Id. at 227. 
 114 Glen Collins, Tobacco’s Broken Line; A Dealer’s Boldest Play May Reshape the Game, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1996, at A1. 
 115 PRINGLE, supra note 32, at 229. 
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settlement between the plaintiffs’ bar (namely the attorneys involved 
with Castano) and his company, the Liggett Group.116  The settlement 
itself, however, never reached fruition because its terms required 
certification of the Castano class action.  Nevertheless, plaintiffs and 
the attorneys general obtained a sworn statement from a Big Tobacco 
CEO affirming that the industry knew nicotine was addictive, and that 
it used that information to its advantage. 
Because the evidence of fraud was indisputable, settlement 
became the tobacco industry’s most attractive option.  In February of 
1998, the industry settled for a total amount of $368.5 billion: 
$10 billion in the first year, of which $7 billion would go to the 
states and $3 billion to the federal Department of Health and 
Human Services to fund a smoking cessation campaign, enforce a 
ban of sales to minors, and set up a compensation fund for 
smokers who win court cases.  Thereafter the industry would pay 
$8.5 billion rising to $15 billion annually in perpetuity.117 
 The $368.5 billion would suffice for the first twenty-five years of 
the settlement.118  Finally, the industry settled attorneys’ fees at 
approximately $8 billion.119  This settlement sent a message not only 
to Big Tobacco, but also to other unpopular industries.  Litigation 
proved to be an effective tool to regulate companies that caused 
direct and indirect harm to the American populace.  In addition, the 
monetary rewards that accompanied settlement encouraged 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to initiate similar actions against other industries.  
One of the overarching questions the Big Tobacco battle left open 
was: Who was next? 
PART II—FAST FOOD: THE NEXT STEP? 
A. The Complaint 
Against the backdrop of the Big Tobacco litigation and the state 
settlement, fast food has become the next target of the plaintiffs’ bar.  
In his complaint, Caesar Barber named popular fast food chains such 
as McDonald’s, Burger King, Wendy’s, and KFC as defendants.120  
Perhaps borrowing from the claims brought against Big Tobacco, 
Barber alleged that the fast food industry’s business practices led to 
 
 116 Id. at 228. 
 117 For a complete copy of the Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA”), see 
http://stic.neu.edu/settlement/6-20-settle.htm. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Barber Compl., supra note 10, at ¶ 1. 
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his health problems, which, in turn, had direct and indirect negative 
socio-economic effects.121  Direct effects included “healthcare costs for 
preventive, diagnostic, and treatment services related to obesity.”122  
Indirect effects included “the value of wages lost by individuals who 
are unable to work because of illness or disability, as well as the value 
of earnings lost by premature death.”123  Barber’s focus on these socio-
economic effects is significant because he was most likely attempting 
to gain the attention of states’ attorneys general.  If plaintiffs are able 
to show an effective link between high fat, salt, and cholesterol 
content in fast food and the costs of health care, that connection 
could encourage states’ attorneys general to initiate suits against fast 
food companies. 
Barber has brought this lawsuit as a class action.124  As such, he 
was hoping to sue on behalf of all Americans suffering from the 
adverse health effects allegedly caused by consuming fast food.  The 
common issues raised in the complaint were whether the defendants’ 
products caused, exacerbated, or induced overweight, obesity, and 
other health effects, whether the defendants knew of these harmful 
effects, and whether the defendants adequately warned consumers.125  
In addition to stating that the requirements for a class action were 
satisfied,126 Barber alleged that millions of Americans would be 
affected by this lawsuit, thus making joinder127 impracticable.128  The 
use of the class action in this context is significant not only because it 
joins parties who share common issues, but also because it is a vehicle 
to bring about settlement quickly, offering global resolution.129  As 
such, the class action has become, and was utilized as, another 
weapon in the arsenal of the plaintiffs’ bar. 
Barber brought several causes of action in his complaint.  First, 
he alleged that the defendants’ agents, servants, and/or employees 
“negligently, recklessly, carelessly and/or intentionally engaged in 
distribution, ownership, retail, manufacture, sale, marketing and/or 
 
 121 Id. at ¶ 23. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at ¶ 25-34; see also supra notes 51-53. 
 125 Barber Compl., supra note 10, at ¶ 28. 
 126 See supra notes 51-53. 
 127 “Joinder” refers to multiple plaintiffs suing together if their asserted claims 
arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise 
in the action.”  FED R. CIV. P. 20(a). 
 128 Barber Compl., supra note 10, at ¶ 26. 
 129 See Erichson, supra note 81 (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Punitive Damage Class 
Actions and the Baseline of Tort, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 944 (2001)). 
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production of food products that are high in fat, salt, sugar and 
cholesterol.”130  Barber also tailored an action under a failure to warn 
theory.131  In his complaint, he asserted that “the defendants132 failed 
to warn and/or adequately warn the users and consumers of the 
aforesaid food products of the quantity and levels of fat, salt, sugar, 
and cholesterol content . . . .”133 The third cause of action alleged the 
fast food industry’s failure to post nutritional facts.134  Barber claimed 
the defendants135 failed “to label and/or adequately label, represent, 
warn or properly account to the users and consumers of nutritional 
values, including but not limited to, the quantities and qualities of fat, 
salt, sugar and cholesterol content, of their respective food 
products.”136  Finally, Barber alleged a violation of New York’s 
Consumer Fraud Statute.137  The pleading stated: 
defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices, in 
violation of the consumer fraud statutes and provisions of the 
New York Consumer Fraud Act by failing to adequately disclose 
the health effects of ingestion of certain respective food products 
with high levels of fat salt, sugar, and cholesterol content, which 
have or can be shown to cause obesity, diabetes, coronary heart 
disease, high blood pressure, elevated cholesterol intake, related 
cancers, and/or other detrimental and adverse health effects.138 
Barber sought compensatory damages, injunctive relief requiring 
defendants to label their products, funding of an educational 
program for children, and attorney’s fees and costs.139 
B. Intentional/Negligent Preparation? 
Fast food has become a common staple of American culture.140  
 
 130 Barber Compl., supra note 10, at ¶ 36. 
 131 Id. at ¶ 40. 
 132 See supra note 10. 
 133 Barber Compl., supra note 10, at ¶ 40. 
 134 Id. at ¶ 49. 
 135 See supra note 10. 
 136 Barber Compl., supra note 10, at ¶ 49. 
 137 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349, 350 (Consol. 1999). 
 138 Barber Compl., supra note 10, at ¶ 54 (internal citations omitted). 
 139 Id. at ¶ 57. 
 140 See ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 70 (2002).  Americans spend 
approximately $110 billion on fast food.  Id. at 3. 
The McDonald’s Corporation has become a powerful symbol of 
America’s service economy, which is now responsible for 90 percent of 
the country’s new jobs.  In 1968, McDonald’s operated about one 
thousand restaurants.  Today it has about thirty thousand restaurants 
worldwide and opens almost two thousand . . . each year.  An estimated 
one of every eight workers in the United States has at some point been 
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The crux of any claim for negligence or intentional tort resides in the 
fast food industry’s policies of food preparation.  Many fast food 
companies have established a “zero training” policy to reduce the cost 
of training employees.141  In effect, this policy is intended to simplify 
the equipment and processes used in food preparation.142  It also 
allows employees of a fast food restaurant little latitude to abuse or 
commit error in the food preparation process.143  Such a policy could 
benefit plaintiffs’ attorneys.  First, it would show that fast food 
executives want to maintain a certain level of control over the 
operations of its franchises.  Second, the court may view a “zero 
training” policy as a breach of “reasonable care” in any negligence 
action for obesity, and the adverse health effects that stem from 
obesity, or for simply inadequately training employees.144 
The fast food industry has also engaged in several practices that 
courts could deem intentional.  The Chicken McNugget is one of the 
most popular products marketed by the McDonald’s corporation.145  
Introduced to the market in 1983, the McNugget proved to be a 
success among American consumers.146  Harvard researchers, 
however, uncovered that the Chicken McNugget was more “beef 
extract” than chicken.147  Shortly after this study, McDonald’s altered 
 
employed by McDonald’s.  The company annually hires about one 
million people, more than any other American organization, public or 
private.  McDonald’s is the nation’s largest purchaser of beef, pork, 
potatoes – and the second largest purchaser of chickens. 
Id. at 4. 
 141 Id. at 72.  Burger King Corporation, the McDonald’s Corporation, and Tricon 
Global Restaurants (owner of Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, and KFC) implemented this 
policy.  Id. at 71-72. 
 142 Id.  “The management no longer depends upon the talents or skills of its 
workers—those things are built into the operating system and machines.” Id. at 70. 
 143 Id. at 72. 
 144 See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (1 Cush.) 292, 296 (1850).  “In general, it 
[reasonable care] means that kind and degree of care, which prudent and cautious 
men would use, such as is required by the exigency of the case, and such as is 
necessary to guard against probable danger.”  Id.  Courts recognize causes of action 
for negligent hiring and supervision of employees.  See Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
580 N.W.2d 233, 261 (Wis. 1998) (stating that there is a duty to properly hire, train, 
and supervise employees); see also M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1995); Castillo v. Gared, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
 145 SCHLOSSER, supra note 140, at 139-40. 
 146 Id. at 140. 
 147 Id. 
A chemical analysis of McNuggets by a researcher at Harvard Medical 
School found that their “fatty acid profile” more closely resembled beef 
than poultry.  They were cooked in beef tallow, like McDonald’s fries.  
The chain soon switched to vegetable oil, adding “beef extract” to 
McNuggets during the manufacturing process in order to retain their 
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its preparation formula for the McNugget, and replaced the “beef 
extract” with vegetable oil.148  This change was intentional so as to 
reduce the product’s level of fat content.149  In addition to the 
chicken, a Chicken McNugget is comprised of: 
water, salt, modified corn starch, sodium phosphates, chicken 
broth powder (chicken broth, salt and natural flavoring (chicken 
source)), seasoning (vegetable oil extracts of rosemary, mono, di 
– and triglycerides, lecithin).  Battered and breaded with water, 
enriched bleached wheat flour (niacin, iron, thiamine, 
mononitrate, riboflavin, folic acid), yellow corn flour, bleached 
wheat flour, modified corn starch, salt, leavening (baking soda, 
sodium acid pyrophosphate, sodium aluminum phosphate, 
monocalcium phosphate, calcium lactate), spices, wheat starch, 
dried whey, corn starch.  Batter is set in vegetable shortening.  
Cooked in partially hydrogenated vegetable oil, (may contain 
partially hydrogenated soybean oils and/or partially 
hydrogenated corn oil and/or partially hydrogenated canola oil 
and/or cottonseed oil and/or corn oil).  TBHQ and citric acid 
added to help preserve freshness.  Dimethylpolysiloxane added as 
an anti-foaming agent.150 
In other words, the “old” Chicken McNugget contains levels of 
saturated fat and chemical additives most consumers would not 
expect to find in a “chicken” nugget.  Plaintiff’s attorneys view such a 
process of food preparation as overly processed to the point of being 
dangerous to one’s health.151 
Similarly, almost all Americans are aware of the familiar sales 
pitch, “Would you like to super-size that?”  What many consumers 
may not realize is that they are consuming approximately 50% more 
calories by super-sizing their meal.152  In essence, the fast food 
 
familiar taste.  Today Chicken McNuggets are wildly popular among 
young children – and contain twice as much fat per ounce as a 
hamburger. 
Id. 
 148 Id.; see also infra note 246.  Indeed, McDonald’s has launched new advertising 
campaigns promoting its “new all white meat nuggets.”  Associated Press, McDonald’s 
to Introduce All White-Meat Nuggets (Oct.  8, 2003), available at 
http://dailybeacon.utk.edu/ article.php/11995.  These new and improved nuggets, 
however, still contain 250 calories and 15 grams of fat in every six-piece serving.  
Nicci Micco, The New Fast Food: Health or Hype? SELF, Mar. 2004, at 146.  This is only a 
slight departure from McDonald’s old McNugget, which contained 310 calories and 
20 grams of fat.  Id. 
 149 See infra note 246. 
 150 Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (citing McDonald’s ingredient list). 
 151 Id. 
 152 See Maggie Fox, Jumbo-Sized Junk Food, June 18, 2002, at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/18/health/main512649.shtml.  “It costs 
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industry is encouraging its customers to consume more calories by 
offering them at a cheaper price.153 
In addition to the direct acts of both fast food executives and 
local franchises, the meat packing industry may share some of the 
blame for the spread of diseases related to consuming processed 
meat.154  This industry efficiently supplies McDonald’s and other fast 
food enterprises with most, if not all, of its ground beef.155  
Researchers, specifically the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, estimate that more than three-quarters of food-related 
diseases originate in the food processing/meatpacking process.156  
Furthermore, through effective lobbying to Congress, the 
meatpacking industry has managed to avoid the same liability posed 
on other manufacturers of consumer products.157  Thus, “[t]oday the 
U.S. government can demand the nationwide recall of defective 
softball bats, sneakers, stuffed animals, and foam-rubber toy cows.  
But it cannot order a meatpacking company to remove 
contaminated, potentially lethal ground beef from fast food kitchens 
and supermarket shelves.”158 
These facts offer several alternatives for plaintiffs’ attorneys.  
First, they can make a separate claim against the meatpacking 
industry for its practices.  However, the strong lobbying in which the 
meatpacking industry engages is a significant problem.  Second, they 
could argue that a causal link exists between the practices of the 
meatpacking industry and the fast food industry’s policy of buying its 
meat mainly from these manufacturers.  This argument, however, 
gives rise to various legal principles of agency that are beyond the 
 
eight cents more to purchase McDonald’s Quarter Pounder with Cheese, small 
French fries and a small Coke (890 calories) separately than to buy the Quarter 
Pounder with Cheese large Extra Value Meal, which comes with a large fries and a 
large Coke (1,380 calories).”  Id. 
 153 Id.  McDonald’s, however, has now decided to suspend its super size policy.  
Associated Press, Say Goodbye To Those Super-Size Fries – McDonald’s Is Slimming Down Its 
Menu, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,113105,00.htm. (Mar. 2, 
2004) (on file with author).  McDonald’s spokesperson, Walt Riker, said that the 
company will no longer super-size its meal choices come the end of 2004.  Id.  While 
health and a well-balanced diet are concerns, the main reason for this change, 
according to Riker, is to simplify the menu for both consumers and workers.  Id.  
Richard Adams, an independent franchising consultant also says this policy will help 
improve McDonald’s service and increase work crew efficiency.  Id.; see also supra 
notes 141-43. 
 154 SCHLOSSER, supra note 140, at 196. 
 155 Id. at 196. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
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scope of this Comment.  Furthermore, if the meatpacking industry 
can avoid liability, it is unlikely that plaintiffs’ attorneys would find 
victory against the fast food industry. 
C. Failure to Warn? 
Barber’s cause of action for failure to warn takes its cue from 
legislation passed in 1965 regarding the placement of warning labels 
on cigarette packages.159  A failure to warn claim is rooted in 
traditional negligence principles.160  The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability states that a product is defective “because of 
inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of 
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by 
the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or 
distributor.”161  Thus, the overarching question is whether Barber 
and/or other potential plaintiffs could have avoided the potential 
health risks that fast food may or may not have caused.  As explained 
below, this is a weak argument. 
Several facts illustrate that the fast food industry should be 
required to place nutritional facts on their products.  For example, 
most, if not all, consumers do not realize what a typical strawberry 
milkshake contains.162  A Burger King strawberry shake contains the 
following: 
amyl acetate, amyl butyrate, amyl valerate, anethol, anisyl formate, 
benzyl acetate, benzyl isobutyrate, butyric acid, cinnamyl 
isobutyrate, cinnamyl valerate, cognac essential oil, diacetyl, 
dipropyl ketone, ethyl acetate, ethyl amylketone, ethyl butyrate, 
ethyl cinnamate, ethyl heptanoate, ethyl heptylate, ethyl lactate, 
ethyl methylphenylglycidate, ethyl nitrate, ethyl propionate, ethyl 
valerate, heliotropin, hydroxyphenyl-2-butanone (10 percent 
solution in alcohol),. . . isobutyl anthranilate, isobutyl butyrate, 
lemon essential oil, maltol, 4-methylacetophenone, methyl 
anthranilate, methyl benzoate, methyl cinnamate, methyl heptine 
carbonate, methyl naphthyl ketone, methyl salicylate, mint 
essential oil, neroli essential oil, nerolin, neryl isobutyrate, orris 
butter, phenethyl alcohol, rose, rum ether, •-undecalactone, 
vanillin, and solvent.163 
 
 159 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
 160 Joachim Zekoll, Liability for Defective Products and Services, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 
124 (2002). 
 161 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). 
 162 See SCHLOSSER, supra note 140, at 125-26. 
 163 Id. (citing FENAROLI’S HANDBOOK OF FLAVOR INGREDIENTS 831 (George A. 
Burdock, Ph.D. ed., 4th ed. 2001)). 
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While consumers may realize they are consuming a fattening food 
product, they may not be aware that a “shake” contains a high 
amount of unpronounceable additives and chemicals.  Additionally, 
the McDonald’s Corporation has refused to disclose the ingredients 
of its French fries.164  “The McDonald’s Corporation will not reveal 
the exact origin of the natural flavor added to its French fries.  In 
response to inquiries from Vegetarian Journal, however, McDonald’s 
did acknowledge that its fries derive some of their characteristic 
flavor from ‘animal products.’”165 
Barber and other potential plaintiffs will face two hurdles when 
suing fast food companies under a failure to warn theory.  First, the 
Food and Drug Administration generally “does not require flavor 
companies to disclose the ingredients of their additives, so long as all 
the chemicals are considered by the agency to be GRAS (generally 
regarded as safe).”166  Thus, flavor companies, such as those that 
include additives in many of the fast food industry’s products, are 
able to maintain a certain level of secrecy.167  In order to overcome 
this obstacle, plaintiffs’ attorneys must allege that any warnings the 
fast food industry may post regarding its products are inadequate.168  
That is, these warnings fail to notify consumers of the dangers of 
consuming fast food. 
The second hurdle is not as formidable as it may seem.  The 
Federal Nutritional Labeling and Education Act169 specifically 
exempts restaurants from posting food contents.170  According to 
federal law, the following should be posted on food meant for human 
consumption: “total fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, sodium, total 
carbohydrates, complex carbohydrates, sugars, dietary fiber, and total 
protein contained in each serving size or other unit of measure . . . 
 
 164 SCHLOSSER, supra note 140, at 128. 
 165 Id.; see also infra note 246. 
 166 SCHLOSSER, supra note 140, at 125. 
 167 Id. 
 168 See Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997).  The court 
held in pertinent part that: 
[T]he manufacturer’s duty to warn the consumer is not necessarily 
satisfied by compliance with FDA minimum warning requirements.  
The required warnings must not be misleading, and must be adequate 
to explain to the user the possible dangers associated with the product.  
Whether that duty has been satisfied is governed by the common law of 
the state, not the regulations of the FDA. . . . 
Id. at 303; see also Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 
1965) (holding that since farm laborers are of limited education, mere compliance 
with Department of Agriculture regulations was not enough to avoid liability). 
 169 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2000). 
 170 § 343(q). 
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.”171  Restaurants, however, are specifically exempted from this 
statutory requirement.172  This statute specifically states that 
“[s]ubparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) shall not apply to food (i) 
which is served in restaurants or other establishments in which food is 
served for immediate human consumption or which is sold for sale or use 
in such establishments . . . .”173  At least one court, however, has 
reasoned that a pre-emption defense is unavailing if plaintiffs seek 
relief under New York’s Consumer Fraud Statute.174  That court held 
that “[s]ubsection 4 of the pre-emptive provision specifically permits 
states to require nutrition labeling of food that is exempt under 
subclause (i) or (ii) of 21 U.S.C. § 343 (q)(5)(A).”175 
D. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. (Pelman II) 
Indeed, in Pelman II, the class action brought on behalf of obese 
children, plaintiffs, in their amended complaint, plaintiffs sought 
relief under the New York Consumer Protection Act.176  The 
complaint involved three counts.  First, plaintiffs alleged that 
McDonald’s violated New York’s Consumer Protection Act through 
misleading “advertising campaigns,” citing advertisements 
proclaiming McDonald’s foods were of “a beneficial nutritional 
nature.”177  Second, they alleged that McDonald’s failed to adequately 
disclose that certain food products were less healthy than its publicity 
campaigns represented.178  Third, plaintiffs claimed that McDonald’s 
violated the Consumer Protection Act by “representing to the New 
York Attorney General and to New York consumers that it provides 
nutritional brochures and information” regarding the health content 
of its food, when, in fact it did not.179 
McDonald’s countered these claims, alleging: (1) the statute of 
limitations barred actions for alleged misrepresentations; (2) 
plaintiffs failed to allege they actually observed those 
misrepresentations; (3) plaintiffs did not prove the alleged 
misrepresentations caused plaintiffs’ injury; and (4) the alleged 
misrepresentations were either non-deceptive or puffery.180 
 
 171 § 343(q)(1)(D). 
 172 § 343 (q)(5)(A)(i). 
 173 Id. (emphasis added). 
 174 Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 526 (citing § 343-1(a)(4)). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *2. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at *4. 
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First, the court held that as a result of a 1980 settlement with the 
New York Attorney General, the statute of limitations barred any 
claim that McDonald’s advertising campaigns were never removed.181  
Plaintiffs argued that McDonald’s admitted through trial testimony in 
the United Kingdom that it never ceased that campaign.182  David 
Green, Vice-President of Marketing for McDonald’s, testified that 
following the attorney general’s investigation and settlement, 
McDonald’s “‘continued the campaign for not only a number of 
months but for a few years.’”183  The court held, however, that his “use 
of the past tense that the campaign had ended by 1994, [was] well 
outside of the statute of limitations period for a complaint filed in 
2002.”184  Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that 
the statute of limitations was tolled under either the “continuing 
violations doctrine”185 or a “special accrual rule.”186  It held, however, 
that the statute of limitations had not run for infant plaintiffs.187 
Next, the court held that the infants did not successfully state a 
claim under New York’s Consumer Protection Act.188  Plaintiffs cited 
the Supreme Court of California in Committee on Children’s Television, 
Inc. v. General Foods Corp.,189 in an attempt to argue that “[a]llegations 
of actual deception, reasonable reliance and damages are 
unnecessary.”190  The Pelman court rejected this argument stating 
“[t]hat [the California] decision is based entirely on California . . . 
 
 181 Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *4. 
 182 Id. at *5. 
 183 Id. (citing Pelman II Am. Compl. ¶ 40 (No. 02 CV 7821)). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that “when a plaintiff 
experiences a ‘continuous practice and policy of discrimination, . . . the 
commencement of the statue of limitations may be delayed until the last 
discriminatory act in furtherance of it’”) (emphasis added).  The Pelman II court 
held that the Second Circuit has “disfavored” such a test, and the test’s proper 
context lies within employment discrimination cases.  Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, 
at *5. 
 186 Bingham v. Zolt, 66 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1995) (reasoning that under this 
rule, “a new claim accrues, triggering a new four-year limitations period, each time a 
plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, a new injury caused by the predicate 
RICO violations”).  The Pelman II court, however, held that plaintiffs failed to allege 
any new injuries.  Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at * 5.  Furthermore, additional 
injuries that grow from an original injury do not satisfy this test.  Id. 
 187 Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *6 (stating “McDonald’s has made no showing 
as to why the statute of limitations should not be tolled as to the infant plaintiffs”). 
 188 Id. at *7. 
 189 673 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1983). 
 190 Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *7 n.4 (citing Children’s Television, 673 P.2d at 
668). 
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law.191  The fact that California’s consumer protection statutes lack a 
reliance requirement does not change the settled law in New York.”192  
The court held that New York’s Consumer Protection Act contains 
such a requirement, and plaintiffs’ “vague allegations of reliance on a 
‘long-term deceptive campaign’ are insufficient to fulfill the reliance 
requirement of [section] 350 for otherwise unspecified 
advertisements.”193 Furthermore, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that 
McDonald’s entire campaign was fraudulent.194 
Third, the court found that plaintiffs failed to prove causation.195  
Generally, cases brought under the Consumer Protection Act must 
satisfy a less stringent standard of proximate causation.196  Though the 
causation element is essential, Pelman I only required that the 
plaintiffs show some injury as a result of the McDonald’s advertising 
campaign.197  The purported class representatives specified how many 
times they ate at McDonald’s;198 however, they did not address a host 
of other relevant factors which may or may not have led to their 
health problems such as other foods plaintiffs may have consumed, 
plaintiffs’ amount of exercise, and any family history of diseases 
McDonald’s products allegedly caused.199 
Finally, the court held the advertisements that plaintiffs cited in 
their pleading were not inherently deceptive.200  “In order to 
 
 191 Pelman II, 2003 WL at 22052778, at *7 n.3. 
 192 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 350 (Consol. 1999).  “[F]alse advertising in the conduct 
of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is 
hereby declared unlawful.”  Id.  The statute further defines false advertising as: 
[A]dvertising, including labeling, which is misleading in a material 
respect; and in determining whether any advertising is misleading, 
there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only 
representations made by statement, word, design, device, sound or any 
combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertising fails 
to reveal facts material in the light of such representations with respect 
to the commodity to which the advertising relates under the conditions 
prescribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are 
customary or usual. 
Id. 
 193 Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *8 (internal citation omitted). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at *9. 
 196 See generally Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 
2d 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 197 Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (emphasis added). 
 198 In their amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged Jazlyn Bradley “‘consumed 
McDonald’s foods her entire life . . . during school lunch breaks and before and after 
school, approximately five times per week, ordering two meals per day.’”  Pelman II, 
2003 WL 22052778, at *11 (quoting Pelman II Am. Compl., ¶ 17). 
 199 Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *11. 
 200 Id. at *12. 
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demonstrate . . . that a practice or advertisement is deceptive or 
misleading, it must be shown objectively that a reasonable consumer 
would have been misled by the defendant’s conduct.”201  The court 
felt this test was not satisfied since the advertisements actually 
contained the relevant saturated fat and cholesterol level of both 
McDonald’s hash browns and Chicken McNuggets.202 
As such, the court granted McDonald’s motion to dismiss while 
denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend a second time.203  The court 
reasoned that 
[t]here is no indication that granting plaintiffs leave to amend a 
second time would provide an opportunity to correct the failings 
in the amended complaint.  The plaintiffs have been warned that 
they must make specific allegations about particular 
advertisements that could have caused plaintiffs’ injuries, and to 
provide detail on the alleged connection between those injuries 
and the consumption of McDonald’s foods.  They have failed to 
remedy the defects of the initial complaint in the face of those 
warnings.  Granting leave to amend would therefore by futile.204 
E. The Obesity Epidemic 
Despite the Pelman II court’s willingness to dismiss the latest 
lawsuit against the fast food industry, there is no doubt that America 
is in the midst of an obesity epidemic.  In the 1990s, the United States 
developed a heightened awareness of the growing number of 
Americans dealing with health problems related to obesity.205  On 
average, Americans spend $238 billion per year on obesity-related 
health problems.206  In addition, over 39 million Americans are 
considered “obese.”207  A person is considered “obese” if his or her 
body mass index [BMI] is 30.0 or above.208  In 1999, approximately 61 
percent of adults in the United States were obese as well as 13 
 
 201 Id. 
 202 See id. at *13 (citing Pelman II Am. Compl., at Exhibit G-17). 
 203 Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *14; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a), supra note 
17. 
 204 Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *14. 
 205 See infra notes 209-10.  Since 1991, the prevalence of obesity among U.S. adults 
has increased 74 percent.  Center for Disease Control, Obesity Trends: 1991-2001 
Prevalence of Obesity Among U.S. Adults By State, available at 
www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/ trend/prev_reg. htm (last visited Mar. 5, 
2004) (on file with author). 
 206 New Study Finds Obesity Costs Over $200 Billion, PR NEWS WIRE, Sept. 14, 1999. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id.  “BMI is the ratio of person’s weight (in kilograms) to height (in meters 
squared).”  Id. 
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percent of children and adolescents.209  As such, “[a]pproximately 
300,000 deaths a year in this country are currently associated with 
overweight and obesity.  Left unabated, overweight and obesity may soon 
cause as much preventable disease and death as cigarette smoking.”210 
The above statistics are part of a recent report issued by the 
Surgeon General, David Satcher.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys have used this 
report to establish that obesity is an epidemic facing the American 
populace.211  Furthermore, they hope to show that the federal 
government and local state governments are spending in excess of 
$100 billion combined on the prevention of and care for diseases 
related to obesity.212  In response to this increasing epidemic, the 
Surgeon General recommends nutritional information be made 
available for foods that are prepared and consumed away from the 
home.213  Finally, the Surgeon General places some of the burden of 
preventing this epidemic on the food industry.214 
 
 209 U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,  THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO 
ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY XIII (2001). 
 210 Id. (emphasis added). 
 211 See, e.g., Barber Compl., supra note 10; see also supra note 209, at 10. 
In 1995, the total (direct and indirect) costs attributable to obesity 
amounted to an estimated $99 billion.  In 2000, the total cost 
attributable to obesity was estimated to be $117 billion ($61 billion 
direct and $56 billion indirect).  Most of the cost associated with 
obesity is due to type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, and 
hypertension. 
Id. 
 212 See Barber Compl., supra note 10, at ¶ 24.  A recent study by the Center for 
Disease Control in Atlanta, GA reveals that individual states’ Medicare and Medicaid 
costs are increasing. 
State-level estimates range from $87 million (Wyoming) to $7.7 billion 
(California).  Obesity-attributable Medicare estimates range from $15 
million (Wyoming) to $1.7 billion (California), and obesity-attributable 
Medicaid expenditures range from $23 million (Wyoming) to $3.5 
billion (New York).  The state differences in obesity-attributable 
expenditures are partly driven by the differences in the size of each 
state’s population. 
Center for Disease Control, Overweight and Obesity: Economic Consequences, available at 
www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/economic_consequences.htm (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with author).  New Jersey, alone, spends over $1 billion in 
Medicare and Medicaid to treat diseases associated with obesity.  Id. 
 213 See supra note 209, at 16-25. 
 214 Id. at 28. 
Industry has a vital role in the prevention of overweight and obesity.  
Through the production and distribution of food and other consumer 
products, industry exerts a tremendous impact on the nutritional 
quality of the food we eat and the extent of physical activity in which we 
engage.  Industry can use that leverage to create and sustain an 
environment that encourages individuals to achieve and maintain a 
healthy or healthier body weight. 
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PART III—WILL THE TOBACCO LITIGATION AND 
SETTLEMENT SERVE AS A MODEL FOR FAST FOOD 
LITIGATION? 
Thus far, the court has given two sets of instructions to plaintiffs’ 
attorneys attacking the fast food industry.215  In both cases, the court 
requires more specific evidence of causation and reliance on 
deceptive advertising.216  The Big Tobacco litigation and settlement, 
however, provide other avenues that the plaintiffs may be able to 
pursue. 
The common thread weaving the Big Tobacco settlement with 
the current fast food litigation is plaintiffs’ attorneys using litigation 
as a way to tame, if not destroy, an unpopular industry as well as 
garner significant monetary awards for both plaintiffs and themselves.  
There are, however, significant obstacles.  First, although it is well 
established that high-fat foods contribute to heart disease, 
hypertension, and diabetes,217 there is no scientific evidence that fast 
food itself is addictive.218  Not only does this serve as a substantial 
hurdle for Caesar Barber’s particular case, but would also almost 
certainly bar class certification.219  As the Barnes court instructed, 
establishing addiction for these sorts of class actions is essential for 
claims based on negligence, product liability, or intentional exposure 
to a hazardous substance.220  Furthermore, if the Big Tobacco 
litigation serves as a model, it demonstrates that plaintiffs in the fast 
food litigation must show that the industry caused their supposed 
addiction to fast food.221 
 
Id. 
 215 See generally Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512; Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778. 
 216 Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *11. 
 217 See Must et al., supra note 22. 
 218 No authoritative study has been released establishing an addictive quality in 
fast food.  But see Jeremy Laurance, Fast Food is Addictive in Same Way as Drugs, Say 
Scientists, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 30, 2003, (stating a Princeton University scientist fed 
rats a diet containing 25 percent sugar, and those rats developed withdrawal 
symptoms) available at http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story=373884 (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with author).  However, medical experts are in stark 
disagreement over this issue. Id.  In the case of Big Tobacco, the Surgeon General 
stated that nicotine was addictive.  See supra notes 90-91. 
 219 See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
 220 See Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143-44. 
 221 See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of Barnes.  
Plaintiffs could argue that the court should adopt the reasoning of Stubbs v. Rochester, 
226 N.Y. 516 (1919).  There, the court reasoned: 
If two or more possible causes exist, for only one of which a defendant 
may be liable, and a party injured establishes facts from which it can be 
said with reasonable certainty that the direct cause of injury was the 
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Second, any class action must be narrowly tailored to those that 
frequented fast food establishments.  Despite the Pelman court’s 
instruction, current class actions include those who could have eaten 
at such restaurants only once in their lifetime.222  As seen in the 
Barnes, Engle, and Liggett, such broad classes have reportedly been 
decertified.223 
Finally, there are a host of factors that contribute to obesity.224  
These include foods other than fast food, lack of exercise, and 
heredity.225  In addition, plaintiffs attorneys, following the instructions 
offered in Pelman II, should specify these facts in order to prove that, 
under more relaxed standards of proximate cause under the New 
York Consumer Protection Act, consuming fast food caused the 
defendant’s health problems.226 
Since the Big Tobacco settlement, many attorneys general see 
themselves as bridging the gap between regulatory agencies and 
consumers.227  There are several advantages to states’ attorneys 
general leading the charge in an attack on any unpopular industry.  
First, their involvement softens the corporate defense of assumption 
of the risk.228  The states would serve as the innocent third party the 
fast food industry injured through its actions.229  Undoubtedly, the 
adverse health affects have contributed significantly to state Medicare 
and Medicaid costs.230  Examining the first complaint filed against the 
fast food industry, plaintiffs’ attorneys may be attempting to recruit 
states’ attorneys general to join the fast food fight.231  This begs the 
question: what is the likelihood states attorneys general will join?  It is 
 
one for which the defendant was liable the party has complied with the 
spirit of the rule. 
Id. at 526.  Obesity, however, has many different sources.  See supra note 208.  In 
short, the evidence has not developed to support the prevailing argument in Stubbs. 
 222 Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 
 223 See Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998); Engle v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco, 2000 WL 33534572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2000), rev’d, 
Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 2003). 
 224 Aviva Must et al., The Disease Burden Associated With Overweight and Obesity, 282 
JAMA 1523, 1528-29 (1999). 
 225 Id. at 1529. 
 226 See Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778, at *11. 
 227 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is the 
Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 685, 
688 (2000). 
 228 Id. at 689; see supra note 39. 
 229 Cupp, State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco, 27 PEPP. L. REV. at 689; 
see also Erichson supra note 81. 
 230 See supra note 212. 
 231 Barber Compl., supra note 10, at ¶ 1. 
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difficult to speculate the answer to this question.  It should be noted, 
however, that obesity related diseases cost states comparable amounts 
as diseases related to smoking.232  Furthermore, the amount of deaths 
(approximately 400,000) that result from obesity each year is similar 
to those that result from smoking.233 
Second, the causation element, which is sorely lacking in the 
action against fast food companies, is not as strong a barrier.234As 
Professor Cupp explains, “[l]awsuits brought by states rather than 
individuals may also allow for looser causation rulings, particularly 
regarding the use of statistical evidence.”235  The more statistical 
evidence showing not only state costs incurred as a result of obesity, 
but the link between fast food and adverse health effects, the greater 
the possibility the causation requirement will be satisfied.  Finally, 
states attorneys general would facilitate the coordination of resources 
against the industry.236  This approach is already underway in lawsuits 
against other unpopular industries.237 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys attacking the fast food industry, alone, will 
meet two inevitable obstacles.  First, they must establish causation.  
The difficulty here is that many factors contribute to heart disease, 
diabetes, and other diseases that result from obesity.238  While studies 
show that there is a clear link between obesity and health risks, the 
causal link breaks when one is seeking the root of obesity.  Studies 
show that lack of exercise, among other things, is a common factor as 
to why people become obese.239 
 
 232 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.  Tobacco related diseases cost states 
approximately $100 billion in the early 1990s.  Today, diseases related to obesity cost 
states approximately $117 billion.  Id. 
 233 Each year, approximately 400,000 Americans die from diseases associated with 
tobacco use. Robert A. Levy, Estimating the Numbers of Smoking-Related Deaths, 284 
JAMA 1319 (2000). Approximately 300,000 Americans die each year from diseases 
related to obesity.  See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 234 Cupp, supra note 227, at 689. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 690. 
Governmental litigation against firearms manufacturers and lead paint 
producers has already begun.  Some of the industries discussed in the 
media as additional potential post-tobacco targets include alcohol 
producers, health insurers, prescription drug manufacturers, nursing 
home operators, sweepstakes distributors, car rental companies, 
gambling establishments, and fast food restaurants serving fatty foods. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 238 See supra note 209. 
 239 Id.; see also Must et al., supra note 223, at 1529.  But see Center for Disease 
Control, Obesity and Genetics: What We Know, What We Don’t Know and What it Means, 
(indicating that obese individuals have genetic similarities, and individuals with a 
  
2004 COMMENT 1413 
Despite the lack of evidence establishing causation, plaintiffs 
could allege that consuming fast food was a “substantial factor” in 
causing their obesity.  Under the “substantial factor” test, every 
defendant who is a substantial factor in the alleged harm is treated as 
a cause in fact.240  If plaintiffs fail to establish the requisite causation 
for purposes of various states’ consumer protection statutes, they may 
have some recourse under this theory.  Plaintiffs could argue that, 
while there are other causes of obesity, (such as hereditary traits, lack 
of exercise, and other foods) consistent consumption of fast food was 
a substantial factor in the plaintiffs’ obesity and related health 
problems; thus, treating one, or all, of the fast food companies as the 
cause in fact. 
The second obstacle attorneys will find is whether the fast food 
industry committed fraud against consumers.  There is scant evidence 
that suggests fast food companies knowingly and willfully encourage 
consumers to absorb more calories.241  None of that evidence, 
however, rises to the level of fraud committed by the major American 
tobacco companies.242  States’ attorneys general may solve these 
problems by presenting the state as an innocent third party since 
states’ healthcare costs incurred in treating obesity and its associated 
health problems are staggering.243 
In Pelman I, the court reasoned that a “necessary element of any 
potentially viable claim must be that McDonald’s products involve a 
danger that is not within the common knowledge of the 
consumers.”244  However, as noted above, a more important element 
to any claim against a fast food giant is fraud.  Excluding state 
attorney general involvement, fraud was the crucial element in 
winning the attack against Big Tobacco.245  The absence of fraud does 
 
family history of obesity may be predisposed to gaining weight) available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/oldWeb01_16_04/info/perspectives/files/obesknow
.htm. (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with author). 
 240 Cause in fact “requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s conduct 
caused legally recognized damages.”  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 166 (2001).  
The substantial factor test has often been explained utilizing the hypothetical of two 
fires destroying the plaintiff’s property.  See id. at § 171 (citing Anderson v. 
Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920)).  In that 
hypothetical, if one fire was caused by lightening, and the other by the tortfeasor, the 
judge could find that the tortfeasor liable for the resulting damages.  Id. 
 241 See Fox, supra note 152; see also Micco, supra note 148 (indicating that the new 
and improved products some fast food companies are offering, are still unhealthy if 
eaten in large quantities). 
 242 See supra notes 92-116 and accompanying text. 
 243 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 244 Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 518. 
 245 See supra notes 92-119 and accompanying text. 
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not completely foreclose plaintiffs’ odds of emerging victorious in 
any future battle with fast food.  Indeed, science may reveal that fast 
food is addictive.246  Furthermore, whistleblowers may come forth and 
reveal the inside operations of the industry.  In light of Pelman, 
however, it seems to be the “theory of last resort” for plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Analyzing the framework the Big Tobacco litigation and attorney 
general settlement provides, as well as the merits of current claims 
against fast food, it seems that absent state attorney general 
involvement and/or allegations of fraud, these suits will be 
dismissed.247 First, although there might be some evidence that the 
fast food industry has injured the public, there still is a need for 
whistle-blowers to show fraud on the part of the fast food industry.248 
As of yet, no corporate insiders have come forth to reveal what has 
occurred behind the closed doors of the fast food industry.  Such 
insiders were essential to the success of the Big Tobacco settlement.249 
Second, the factors that barred class action certification in the 
tobacco litigation—namely, causation and comparative and 
contributory negligence—will most likely preclude class certification 
in the current litigation.  Such individualized issues will most likely 
lead courts either to bar certification, or to de-certify on appeal class 
actions against fast food companies.  In addition, courts will most 
likely consider whether allowing such class actions would lead to the 
proverbial flood of unmeritorious claims.  Finally, while the Big 
Tobacco litigation and settlement offer an appropriate and helpful 
background in analyzing future mass tort claims against unpopular 
industries, it set forth no new law.  There was no court ruling or 
finality, absent the settlement.  “If it changes anything, it’s going to 
make plaintiff’s attorneys more willing to take chances and be more 
innovative in the approaches that they take in lawsuits. But this was a 
settlement.  It did not make any law.”250 
Even if fast food lawsuits are continually dismissed, the litigation 
 
 246 See supra note 218. 
 247 See Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512; Pelman II, 2003 WL 22052778. 
 248 George Washington Law Professor, John Banzhaf, and his students recently 
received a 12.1 million dollar settlement from McDonald’s for mislabeling its French 
fries as vegetarian when in fact they were prepared in beef extract.  As part of the 
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against the fast food industry will not disappear.  If the Big Tobacco 
war demonstrated anything, it was the resolve of the plaintiffs’ bar to 
attack industries that injure American consumers.  Even now, some in 
the fast food industry have altered its business practices by offering 
healthier foods such as the all white meat McNugget, terminating its 
“super size” policy, and promoting healthier foods such as salads and 
pizza with less amounts of cheese.  Thus, some may argue, these 
lawsuits have some value. 
Eventually, corporate insiders may come forth and reveal what is 
inside the franchises of fast food.  Such revelations are dependent on 
the number of claims filed, and the number of Americans inflicted 
with diseases related to obesity that lead to death.  As these statistics 
rise, more pressure is placed on the industry and states’ attorneys 
general to bring suit on behalf of American consumers.  But until 
then, most of these suits will be dismissed in the courts of law and 
public opinion. 
 
